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THE VIABILITY OF ANTITRUST PRICE 
SQUEEZE CLAIMS 
Erik N. Hovenkamp∗ & Herbert Hovenkamp∗∗ 
A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm “squeezes” a rival’s 
margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival and 
a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes 
have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a 
century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with 
Judge Hand’s famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945, and concluding with 
the Supreme Court’s 2009 Linkline decision, which applied a strict cost-based test 
to price squeeze claims. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a 
“fairness” or “fair profit” test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually 
adopted a cost-based test, although a somewhat different one than most courts and 
scholars would adopt today. We conclude that strictly cost-based predatory 
pricing tests such as the one the Supreme Court developed in its 1993 Brooke 
Group decision are not always appropriate to the concerns being raised in a price 
squeeze. We also consider several efficiency explanations, the importance of joint 
costs, situations in which the dominant firm uses a squeeze to appropriate the 
fixed-cost portion of the rival’s investment, as well as those where the shared input 
is a fixed rather than variable cost for the rival. Ultimately, we find little room for 
antitrust liability except in one circumstance: where a squeeze is used to restrain 
the rival’s vertical integration into the monopolized market. That situation is not 
captured by the Linkline’s cost-based rule. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Vertical Integration and the “Price Squeeze” 
A price or margin “squeeze” occurs when a vertically integrated firm sells 
an input to unintegrated rivals who also compete with the vertically integrated firm 
in a downstream market. The claim is that the large firm “squeezes” the rival 
between a high wholesale price for the input and its own low price in the 
downstream market. In its Linkline decision the Supreme Court went a long way 
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toward shutting the door on price squeeze claims.1 While the Court did not 
expressly overrule Judge Hand’s famous decision in United States v. Alcoa, it did 
so in fact.2 Judge Hand had condemned the defendant for selling raw aluminum 
ingot to unintegrated “rollers,” a type of fabricator that formed aluminum into 
sheets of various gauges for use by manufacturers further downstream.3 Alcoa also 
made its own rolled sheet. The Government claimed that Alcoa charged the 
independent fabricators a high price for ingot but resold its own rolled sheet to 
customers at such a low price that the independent, unintegrated fabricators could 
not make a living on the margin that was left. 
In assessing this claim Judge Hand looked at Alcoa’s own costs for 
producing rolled sheet from raw ingot and assumed that the rivals’ costs were the 
same as Alcoa’s. He also assumed that the independents needed to sell their sheet 
at the same price that Alcoa sold sheet in order to survive in the market. He 
concluded on these numbers that the independent sheet rollers could not survive 
under Alcoa’s pricing.4 While Judge Hand wrote of the independent fabricator’s 
                                                                                                                
    1. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) 
(reversing Linkline Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2007)). The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Solicitor General recommended review, while the 
FTC recommended against review. See Debra Cassens Weiss, High Court to Hear ‘Price 
Squeeze’ Antitrust Case that Split FTC and SG, A.B.A. J., June 23, 2008, available at 
http://abajournal.com/news/high_court_to_hear_price_squeeze_antitrust_case_that_split_ftc
_and_sg/. Compare Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (accepting a version of price squeeze which meets predatory pricing test, 
requiring prices below cost and likelihood of recoupment), with Covad Commc’ns Co. v. 
Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 673–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting price squeeze claim where 
defendant―who was free to refuse to deal―was not engaging in orthodox predatory pricing 
in downstream market), and Cavalier Tel., LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc. 330 F.3d 176, 190 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (same). 
By contrast to a “price squeeze,” a “supply squeeze” occurs when a vertically related 
monopolist denies or limits its unintegrated rivals’ access to some source of supply. See 3B 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 767b (3d ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW]. The Supreme Court’s decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007), involved allegations of a kind of 
supply squeeze in which a firm that lacked power in the downstream market allegedly bid 
the price of an essential input up, thus squeezing rivals between input costs and the market 
price. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court held that such a claim required a showing of predatory 
pricing—namely, that the dominant firm bid the price up so high that it was required to 
resell at a loss, and that the market structure indicated that it would be in a position to 
recoup these losses once the rivals had exited from the market. Id. at 318–20. Cf. Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993). On 
Weyerhaeuser, see 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra, ¶ 747. On the predatory pricing recoupment 
requirement, see id. ¶¶ 725–26. On the requirement of prices below cost, see id. ¶¶ 739–40. 
    2. See Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1120 n.3 (purporting to distinguish United States 
v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
    3. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 437–38. 
    4. See id. at 436–37. 
Between the years 1925 and 1937 inclusive “Alcoa’s” books show the 
price of all these kinds of “sheet” for the “gauges” in question, together 
with the cost of making it from ingot. They also show the price of ingot, 
which was of course the same for all “gauges” and for all kinds of 
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legal entitlement to a “fair price”5 from Alcoa, he in fact employed a cost-based 
test. The test was that the margin between the price at which Alcoa sold sheet to 
the independent rollers and its own resale price for rolled aluminum must be at 
least sufficient to cover the costs that Alcoa itself incurred for the same set of 
processes. In other words, Judge Hand applied a somewhat primitive version of an 
“equally efficient rival” test, such as the one that Judge Posner has advocated for 
unlawful exclusionary conduct assessed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.6 
Judge Hand’s test for a price squeeze was not technical about the cost 
measure it was employing. One cannot tell from the opinion whether he included 
fixed costs, and thus gave an average total cost measure, or included only variable 
costs.7 All we know from the opinion is that he pulled the data from various tables 
                                                                                                                
“sheet,” as it was the same for all uses of aluminum other than “sheet.” . 
. . 
The plaintiff’s theory is that “Alcoa” consistently sold ingot at 
so high a price that the “sheet rollers,” who were forced to buy from it, 
could not pay the expenses of “rolling” the “sheet” and make a living 
profit out of the price at which “Alcoa” itself sold “sheet.” To establish 
this the plaintiff asks us to take “Alcoa’s” costs of “rolling” as a fair 
measure of its competitors’ costs, and to assume that they had to meet 
“Alcoa’s” price for all grades of “sheet,” and could not buy ingot 
elsewhere. It seems to us altogether reasonable, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary, to suppose that “Alcoa’s” “rolling” costs were not higher 
than those of other “sheet rollers” . . . . 
Id. 
One contemporary critic complained of the fact that Judge Hand took the cost data 
directly from Alcoa’s account books and did not require the Government to establish the 
costs directly. See G. E. Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of the Antitrust Laws upon 
Combinations of Successive Stages of Production and Distribution, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 921, 
929–31 (1949). 
    5. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 438 (“[O]n this record the price of ingot must be regarded 
as higher than a ‘fair price.’”). 
    6. Judge Posner’s definition of exclusionary conduct requires the plaintiff to 
show: 
that the defendant has monopoly power and . . . that the challenged 
practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant’s 
market an equally or more efficient competitor. The defendant can rebut 
by proving that although it is a monopolist and the challenged practice 
exclusionary, the practice is, on balance, efficient. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194–95 (2d ed. 2001); see also 3 ANTITRUST LAW, 
supra note 1, ¶ 651b4 (arguing that this test is a good one for pricing practices, although not 
for all practices that might be challenged under Section 2). 
    7. A variable cost is a cost that varies with the amount of output a firm 
produces, such as employed ingredients, production utilities and labor; further, these costs 
can be avoided if the firm ceases producing. A fixed cost is constant over a large range of 
production and must be paid whether or not the firm produces. For example, a mortgage 
payment on the plant must be paid even if the plant is shut down and the size of the payment 
typically does not vary with the amount the plant is producing. In order to make a profit 
over the long run, a firm must set a price high enough to cover its average total costs. 
However, it will continue to produce as long as it is covering average variable cost, for any 
contribution to fixed costs is better than nothing. If a firm cannot even cover its average 
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that Alcoa had submitted during the course of the litigation. The most likely 
measures are these: first, if the spread between Alcoa’s wholesale price for raw 
ingot and its resale price of rolled aluminum was sufficient to cover its average 
total cost of rolling aluminum, then an equally efficient rival should have been able 
to earn a profit rolling Alcoa’s ingot into sheet. Second, if the spread sufficiently 
covered the smaller firm’s variable costs8 of rolling, but not its fixed costs, then the 
smaller firm would likely continue producing, but it would probably not rebuild 
the rolling mill when it wore out. Third, if the squeeze did not even give the 
smaller firm a margin sufficiently wide to cover its variable cost of rolling, then it 
would be most profitable to shut down.9 This latter option is tantamount to a 
refusal to deal. 
High fixed costs create more room for a squeeze in which the independent 
firm can cover its variable costs but not its fixed costs. A typical attribute of 
industries with high fixed costs is that a vertically integrated firm can profitably 
increase output by engaging in price discrimination, and this can lead to situations 
in which a large firm actually charges a lower “retail” price to its own customers 
than it charges its rival for the requisite input. For example, suppose I am a 
vertically integrated firm with a monopoly in an upstream market for Alpha, an 
input into the production of Beta, which is sold downstream to consumers. A 
downstream entrant wishes to buy Alpha from me. Because the inputs used in 
producing Beta are not homogenous, this rival invests in the specific production 
technologies required to make Beta from my Alpha. Suppose that every unit of 
Beta is sold downstream for $100, and that it costs $20 to fabricate Beta from 
Alpha. I sell Alpha to my rival for $70, which includes a $20 markup. At this price 
my rival earns a $10 profit on each unit of Beta sold downstream. However, I learn 
that I can profit by offering a quantity discount of ten units of Beta for $650. This 
package price of $65 per unit is $5 less than the price I charge my rival for Alpha. 
However, it is profitable for me because I still earn a profit of $150 on the bundle; 
I have simply used this bundle as a way of appealing to large-scale consumers that 
were not otherwise willing to buy my product. At this per-unit price level, my rival 
clearly faces a price squeeze, yet I have every reason to impose it. The squeeze 
(which exists only with respect to customers of ten or more units) is merely the 
result of an independently profitable price-discrimination strategy. 
Controlling price discrimination in regulated industries subject to high 
fixed costs is a highly complex regulatory task. On the one hand, price 
discrimination in such cases clearly increases output and thus enables the regulated 
firm to charge less to everyone. That is, price discrimination enables a seller in 
such an industry to capture additional sales in a range where the contribution of a 
price to fixed cost is quite low but nevertheless positive.10 On the other hand, price 
                                                                                                                
variable costs it will ordinarily shut down. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 8.2 (3d ed. 2005). 
    8. Presumably the price of the ingot itself, plus the labor, utilities, and other 
costs that varied with output. 
    9. For a detailed explanation, see infra Appendix A. 
  10. See 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 130 (4th ed. 1991); Martin K. Perry, Price Discrimination and Forward 
Integration, 9 BELL J. ECON. 209, 210 (1978); see also Alexander C. Larson & Steve G. 
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discrimination often entails that the marginal sale is made at a much lower price 
than much more inframarginal sales to long-term customers.  
B. The Price Squeeze and the Refusal to Deal 
Should the antitrust laws ever impose liability for a price squeeze if the 
defendant had no duty to deal with the plaintiff to begin with? Under the Supreme 
Court’s Trinko decision,11 if such a duty to deal exists it is an extraordinarily 
narrow one. However, Trinko itself suggested some exceptions—namely, where 
the two firms had established a previous course of dealing,12 and where the 
dominant firm was dealing with others on a regular basis.13 
Price squeeze claims encounter all the problems that serve to limit 
antitrust liability for unilateral refusals to deal. The main problem is that forcing a 
dominant firm to share an input with a rival does not benefit consumers unless a 
court is also willing to regulate the price at which sharing occurs. If forced to sell 
an input to a rival, a monopolist can be expected to charge the rival a price such 
that the full monopoly markup stays with the monopolist and the rival gets no 
more than a sufficient return to keep it in production.14 Further, such an order to 
deal has the perverse effect of removing that rival’s incentive to innovate, as it 
receives the same returns regardless of any improvements.15 
One simple way of disposing of price squeeze claims is to regard them as 
completely encompassed within the law of refusal to deal. As this argument goes, 
a firm should never be condemned for selling to a rival at an unfavorable price 
when an absolute refusal to deal would have been lawful. If the input really is 
essential to the smaller firm’s business then it could not survive at all under a 
refusal to deal. Except for loss of investment, the smaller firm cannot do any worse 
and consumers cannot be harmed any more by the dominant firm’s willingness to 
sell, but only at an oppressively high price in relation to output prices. 
Such an approach would not necessarily eliminate all price squeeze 
claims. After all, Trinko placed very severe restrictions on the antitrust law of 
refusal to deal, but it did not explicitly abolish the cause of action altogether. The 
Court qualified but did not overrule its earlier Aspen decision.16 Aspen may still 
have some life in situations where the defendant voluntarily developed a course of 
                                                                                                                
Parsons, Telecommunications Regulation, Imputation Policies and Competition, 16 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (1993) (defending price-discrimination policies that can 
lead to price squeezes). 
  11. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 415 (2004); 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶¶ 771–74, 787 (discussing 
unilateral refusals to deal and the essential facilities doctrine). 
  12. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
  13. Id. at 410. 
  14. See 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 771. 
  15. See infra Appendix B.3. 
  16. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 
(1985); see 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 772c. 
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dealing with its smaller rival and then changed the terms in a way that 
disadvantaged its rival.17 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to find an antitrust rationale for 
condemning price squeezes in situations where the defendant has no obligation to 
deal under Trinko’s restrictive reading of Aspen. The Supreme Court thought as 
much in Linkline.18 The discussion below considers some possible exceptions, and 
some of them might require a remedy of some sort. For example, the dominant 
firm might have somehow induced the smaller firm to make a significant 
specialized investment in the dominant firm’s technology. This investment would 
be based on the dominant firm’s promise to provide an essential but specialized 
input. Later on, when the dominant firm’s own production capacity increased, it 
might decide to starve out the smaller firm by reducing its margin to an amount 
sufficient to cover variable costs but insufficient to pay off fixed costs. In this 
scenario the dominant firm might effectively “rob” the smaller firm’s shareholders 
and creditors of the smaller firm’s fixed-cost assets.19 It would ordinarily do this 
by raising the price of the input being supplied to the rival. While such conduct 
might be regarded as reprehensible, one struggles to find a justification for 
condemning it in the antitrust laws. Indeed, consumer injury is not in prospect and 
antitrust creates no abstract duty on the part of firms to refrain from injuring their 
rivals, even by devious means. 
In one instance consumer harm may be possible. Suppose that after 
supplying a smaller rival for some time the dominant firm realizes that the smaller 
rival is developing the capability to integrate into upstream competition with the 
dominant firm. If that were to happen, the dominant firm would lose its monopoly 
position in the upstream market and would forgo profits resulting from upstream 
sales. Further, by integrating into upstream production the rival avoids double 
marginalization by obtaining the input at production cost. As a result, it will be 
able to produce at a lower cost and will capture a greater portion of the 
downstream market.20 To prevent this, the integrated firm may impose a squeeze 
calculated to rob the smaller firm of the resources needed to develop independence 
in the upstream market. Such a scenario would injure consumers in the long run, as 
they would be denied the benefits of a more competitive overall market structure. 
In its Linkline decision the Supreme Court held that if a monopolist has 
no duty to deal with a rival in the wholesale, or upstream, market its price squeeze 
would not be unlawful unless prices in the retail, or downstream, market were 
                                                                                                                
  17. 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 772e. 
  18. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). See 
discussion infra, text at notes 21−47. 
  19. See infra Appendix B.1–2. 
  20. Double marginalization occurs when a firm’s variable costs include an 
above-cost markup set by another firm. The elimination of double marginalization greatly 
reduces costs and allows lower retail prices to be set. As a result, the foreclosure of one firm 
need not have an adverse impact on consumers if it allows another firm to avoid double 
marginalization. In fact, it is possible that consumers would benefit from such an 
occurrence. See 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 758. In the context of price squeeze 
claims, see Dennis W. Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” Be a Recognized Form of 
Anticompetitive Conduct?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 276 (2008). 
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predatory under Brooke Group standards.21 The defendant AT&T22 was a 
vertically integrated monopolist which wholesaled digital subscriber line (DSL) 
service to rival internet service providers (ISPs) and also provided its own DSL-
based internet service to its own customers.23 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant charged such a high price for its wholesale DSL service and such a low 
price on its retail service that the rivals could not make a reasonable profit on the 
spread between what they had to pay and what they received from their own 
customers. 
The defendant had no antitrust-imposed duty to deal with plaintiffs in the 
upstream market, as had been established in Trinko.24 The Ninth Circuit had 
permitted the claim to go forward, however, concluding that Trinko did not apply 
to price squeezes because they had existed prior to that decision and the Court had 
not purported to reject them.25 Judge Gould dissented from that decision, arguing 
that price squeeze claims should be dismissed when the defendant (1) has no 
antitrust duty to deal in the upstream market and (2) the claim does not satisfy the 
standards imposed by Brooke Group for predatory pricing in the downstream 
market―namely, prices below a relevant measure of cost and a dangerous 
likelihood of recoupment.26 
While the case was pending before the Supreme Court the plaintiffs 
changed their theory, concluding that the Ninth Circuit majority was wrong and 
the dissent correct, and that Brooke Group standards should judge their claim. 
They claimed that the dispute was thus moot, but the Supreme Court disagreed, 
observing that the parties wanted different relief. The defendant wanted the case 
dismissed but the plaintiff wanted a remand to replead under Brooke Group 
standards.27 The Court also observed that the plaintiffs spoke repeatedly in their 
brief of a “price squeeze” claim rather than a “predatory pricing” claim, indicating 
that they were ambiguous about abandonment of their earlier theory of action.28 
Going to the merits, the Court observed that while a monopolist might in 
rare instances have an antitrust-imposed duty to deal with a rival, this was not such 
                                                                                                                
  21. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109. The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Breyer filed 
an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. 
  22. The case was styled “Pacific Bell Co.,” although as a result of a merger 
AT&T became the controlling party. 
  23. Linkline, the named plaintiff, was one of four ISP plaintiffs in the case. 
  24. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 410 (2004). 
  25. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1116 (citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, 503 F.3d 876, 
883 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
  26. 503 F.3d at 886−87 (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222−24 (1993)). On the pricing and recoupment standards 
imposed by Brooke Group, see 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶¶ 735−42 (pricing), and 
id. ¶¶ 725−30 (recoupment). 
  27. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1117. 
  28. Id. 
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a case.29 In this case, as in Trinko, the only duty to deal that the defendant had was 
imposed by FCC regulations enacted under the Telecommunications Act.30 The 
Court noted the Ninth Circuit’s observation that Trinko did not discuss price 
squeeze claims, but found that Trinko applied in this situation with equal force: 
AT&T could have squeezed its competitors’ profits just as 
effectively by providing poor-quality interconnection service to the 
plaintiffs, as Verizon allegedly did in Trinko. But a firm with no 
duty to deal in the wholesale market has no obligation to deal under 
terms and conditions favorable to its competitors. If AT&T had 
simply stopped providing DSL transport service to the plaintiffs, it 
would not have run afoul of the Sherman Act. Under these 
circumstances, AT&T was not required to offer this service at the 
wholesale prices the plaintiffs would have preferred.31 
As to the downstream prices, the principal assertion in the plaintiff’s 
complaint was that they were “too low,” but without reference to cost. But the 
Court had addressed this issue in Brooke Group as well as its Cargill decision, and 
concluded that “too low” is meaningless unless it is understood in relation to some 
objective standard, such as cost.32 The Court elaborated: 
Recognizing a price squeeze claim where the defendant’s retail 
price remains above cost would invite the precise harm we sought to 
avoid in Brooke Group: Firms might raise their retail prices or 
refrain from aggressive price competition to avoid potential antitrust 
liability. See 509 U.S., at 223 (“As a general rule, the exclusionary 
effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the 
lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents 
competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a 
judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of 
chilling legitimate price cutting”).33 
As a result, the plaintiff’s case amounted to nothing more than:  
an amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail level and a 
meritless claim at the wholesale level. If there is no duty to deal at 
the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, then 
a firm is certainly not required to price both of these services in a 
manner that preserves its rivals’ profit margins.34 
                                                                                                                
  29. Id. at 1118 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585, 608−11 (1985)). 
  30. Id. at 1118 n.2. 
  31. Id. at 1119. 
  32. Id. at 1120 (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993)); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 
121−22 n.17 (1986); and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 
(1990)). 
  33. Id. 
  34. Id. 
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On this issue the Supreme Court did not quite explicitly overrule Judge 
Hand’s decision in Alcoa.35 However, “[g]iven developments in economic theory 
and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa, we find our recent decisions in Trinko and 
Brooke Group more pertinent to the question before us.”36 Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to read the majority opinion as doing anything other than overruling 
Alcoa, which never insisted on a showing that downstream prices were lower than 
cost. Further, as discussed infra, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the theory 
that Judge Hand adopted that an unlawful price squeeze could be found if the 
margin between the upstream and downstream prices was so small that even the 
defendant itself could sell profitably if it were paying the same upstream price as 
the plaintiff―that is, the defendant was imposing a margin so low that it was 
below its own intermediate costs as well as those of the plaintiff.37 
Finally, the Court warned that “institutional concerns” counseled against 
recognizing price squeeze claims without an objective cost-based test.38 
Administering antitrust predatory-pricing claims involving a single level of sales 
had proven to be difficult enough. But, “[r]ecognizing price-squeeze claims would 
require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and retail prices to 
ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed. And courts would be aiming at a 
moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may result 
in a squeeze.”39 
Further, a test that did not require a cost basis would not provide a safe 
harbor for defendants to compete aggressively; they would always be left 
wondering if their prices cross a line that was not clearly identified.40 The Court 
then quoted this passage from Justice Breyer’s Concord decision, written when he 
was on the First Circuit: 
[H]ow is a judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the 
price charged by other suppliers of the primary product? None exist. 
Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary 
level not monopolized? How can the court determine this price 
without examining costs and demands, indeed without acting like a 
rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting proceedings of which 
often last for several years? Further, how is the court to decide the 
                                                                                                                
  35. See id. at 1120 n.3 (discussing United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 438 (2d 
Cir. 1945)). 
  36. Id. 
  37. The problem arises when the defendant sells in the upstream market at a 
price higher than its own costs. To illustrate, suppose that the defendant has upstream costs 
of five to produce the DSL lines, and additional distribution costs of four. If it sells DSL to 
its customers at a price of ten, that is higher than its own costs. But suppose it charges rivals 
seven for the upstream DSL lines while forcing the rivals to compete with its downstream 
price of nine. They could not compete on a markup of three, but neither could the defendant 
itself. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 438 (accepting this reasoning); see also supra Part I.A. 
  38. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1120−21 (citing Town of Concord v. Boston Edison 
Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) and Phillip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet 
in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)). 
  39. Id. at 1121. 
  40. Id. (citing 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 767c). 
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proper size of the price ‘gap?’ Must it be large enough for all 
independent competing firms to make a ‘living profit,’ no matter 
how inefficient they may be? . . . And how should the court respond 
when costs or demands change over time, as they inevitably will?41 
The Court also rejected a test proposed by the American Antitrust 
Institute that would condemn even an above-cost price squeeze if the defendant 
itself could not compete on the margin between its upstream wholesale price to a 
rival and its downstream price to customers—or perhaps even in cases where the 
wholesale price was actually higher than the retail price, forcing the plaintiff to 
accept negative margins: “If both the wholesale price and the retail price are 
independently lawful, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability simply 
because a vertically integrated firm’s wholesale price happens to be greater than or 
equal to its retail price.”42 
The Court also rejected alternative theories, such as the one that price 
squeezes might raise entry barriers, thus “fortifying” the monopolist’s position, or 
that they might impair nonprice competition or innovation in the downstream 
market. In this case the plaintiffs had not identified any such harms.43 
In his concurring opinion Justice Breyer largely agreed with the majority 
about the ultimate disposition―namely, that the district court should determine 
whether the complaint stated a cause of action for predatory pricing under Brooke 
Group standards. He emphasized mainly that a “regulatory structure” existed in 
this case, and that it was the FCC’s obligation to see to it that the wholesale 
transfer prices were “just and reasonable,” taking all relevant factors into account. 
And “[w]hen a regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy anticompetitive 
harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits.”44 
Further, 
[u]nlike Town of Concord, the regulators here controlled prices 
only at the wholesale level.45 But respondents do not claim that that 
regulatory fact makes any difference; and rightly so, for as far as I 
can tell, respondents could have gone to the regulators and asked for 
petitioners’ wholesale prices to be lowered in light of the alleged 
price squeeze.46 
Although he did not say so explicitly, Justice Breyer’s concurrence seems 
to leave the way open for a price squeeze claim outside of the regulatory context 
even when the Brooke Group standard cannot be met. 
II. STRUCTURAL PREREQUISITES 
The balance of this Essay explores the structural conditions for any viable 
claim of an anticompetitive price squeeze actionable under the antitrust laws. Then 
                                                                                                                
  41. Id. (quoting Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 25). 
  42. Id. at 1122 (citing briefs by two amici). 
  43. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1122 (citing 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 
767c). 
  44. Id. at 1124. 
  45. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 29. 
  46. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1124. 
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it examines the issue of price–cost relations and the well-nigh-universal 
assumption, confirmed by the Supreme Court in Linkline, that a useful test for an 
unlawful price squeeze must be “cost-based.” Finally, it examines the problems of 
consumer injury and administrable remedies. 
A. Conventional Power Lacking: Pre-Existing Relationships and the 
“Committed” Rival 
Antitrust laws require proof of substantial market power before unilateral 
conduct can be condemned. Section 2 of the Sherman Act47 applies only to 
“monopolists,” which generally requires a firm with a market share of at least 70% 
or so of a well defined market.48 By contrast, Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
requires only that there be a contract “in restraint of trade.”49 A purely vertical 
agreement must be assessed under the rule of reason.50 However, the market power 
requirements are still considerably less than they are for unilateral conduct. 
The ability to impose narrow margins that are harmful to unintegrated 
rivals does not require market power in the classic sense at all. Indeed, price 
squeezes can occur in at least somewhat competitive markets where the smaller 
firm has made a substantial investment in a specific location or asset that 
inexorably links itself to the vertically integrated firm. For example, suppose that 
an aluminum fabricator locates its fabrication plant adjacent a vertically integrated 
aluminum ingot producer’s plant.51 While fabricated aluminum parts are costly in 
relation to transportation costs, aluminum ingot is not, so proximity between the 
ingot producer and the fabricator is valuable. At that point, the adjacent vertically 
integrated firm has a significant transportation cost advantage and can raise the 
price of aluminum ingot to the small firm accordingly. Whether a true squeeze can 
be created is another matter. If the market is undifferentiated, the small fabricator 
has the option of purchasing ingot elsewhere, so the dominant firm can increase its 
ingot price only up to the transportation cost difference of the second-best-placed 
rival. If the smaller firm’s location does not prevent it from dealing profitably with 
other fabricators, then there cannot be a squeeze; the vertically integrated firm 
would simply be taking advantage of the transport cost difference, allowing it to 
capture some of its rival’s rents. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, 
including the extent of the vertically integrated firm’s ability to fabricate its own 
aluminum, the smaller firm might be in a good position to take advantage of the 
vertically integrated firm; that is, the firms might be involved in a bilateral 
monopoly. 
                                                                                                                
  47. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
  48. 3B ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 801a. 
  49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
  50. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135−36 (1998) (purely 
vertical agreement, even if intended to hurt a rival and deceive customers, must be assessed 
under rule of reason); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1902d (2d ed. 2005). 
  51. See, e.g., Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 805, 
815 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming a judgment for the plaintiff); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 23−24, 37 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversing a 
directed verdict for the defendant). 
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If the smaller firm’s commitment derives from its investment in a specific 
technology that is unique to the vertically integrated firm, then a form of price 
squeeze can also occur. For example, suppose that Kodak licenses a small firm to 
make aftermarket parts for its photocopiers.52 Kodak also manufactures the same 
parts and sells them to service technicians. The parts are unique to Kodak copy 
machines, and the small firm makes a significant investment in the technology 
needed to produce Kodak’s parts. At that point, suppose Kodak either: (1) 
increases the patent-license fees to the smaller rival significantly; (2) reduces the 
price of its own parts; or (3) some combination of the two. As a result the smaller 
firm is squeezed between the price of a costly input (the patent license) and 
Kodak’s output price of parts. In this case, if the squeeze is so significant that the 
smaller firm cannot recover its variable costs, it will either have to shut down or 
abandon its Kodak-specific technology. If the squeeze permits the small firm to 
recover variable costs but not amortize its fixed costs, then Kodak might be in a 
position to appropriate the value of the fixed-cost investment to itself.53 
One is tempted to say that this case resembles market power derived from 
“lock-in,” as the Supreme Court recognized in its Kodak decision in 1992.54 There 
the Court held that a firm with a market share of less than 25% in the market for 
high-speed photocopiers might have market power in its own parts if there was an 
installed base of buyers who were “locked in” to those parts and who were not in a 
position to calculate ownership costs over the life of the product at the time they 
made the initial purchase. This failure could occur because the buyers were 
“myopic,” or more likely, because Kodak raised its parts prices after this installed 
base of buyers made their purchase. 
But there may be important disanalogies to the Kodak case. Whatever one 
thinks about the “lock-in” theory under which the Court found power in Kodak,55 
the endgame included higher purchase prices for parts, or at least for a 
combination of parts and service. In our price squeeze example that is not 
necessarily the case, although it could be. For example, suppose the small licensee 
ends up being a more efficient producer of parts than Kodak itself. In that case it 
might be able to sell parts at a lower price. By raising the license fee Kodak might 
appropriate to itself the efficiency savings of its rival. Injury to consumers is 
doubtful.56 However, if no such price change occurs, then the vertically integrated 
firm cannot be held responsible for its rival’s inability to cover its own costs. 
Finally, in the franchise context an open-ended franchise provision 
requiring the franchisee to accept goods supplied by the franchisor at an 
undetermined price can lead to a squeeze. Suppose that a franchise agreement 
                                                                                                                
  52. The facts are loosely adopted from Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). On market power in derivative markets and aftermarkets, 
see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA et al., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 564 (3d ed. 2007). 
  53. See infra Appendix B.1–2. 
  54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
  55. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 
2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 288 (2001) (arguing that Kodak should be overruled); see 
also 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA et al., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1740 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing for severe 
limitations on Kodak). 
  56. See infra Appendix B.1−2. 
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between Domino’s Pizza and a franchisee requires the franchisee to accept the 
franchisor’s pizza dough at an unspecified price. Such a contract may give the 
franchisor an incentive to set the price of the tied dough so high as to limit the 
franchisee’s returns to a level insufficient to amortize fixed costs. In particular, this 
might occur if the franchisor also stipulates a maximum price for the franchisee’s 
pizzas.57 That would create a situation in which the franchisee would be forced to 
accept infracompetitive margins or face termination of its franchise. 
Significantly, these opportunities to take advantage of vertically related 
firms’ irreversible investments58 might be the result of a pre-existing 
understanding and the dominant firm’s subsequent change of practice. But this 
need not be the case. For example, Kodak may have induced a smaller firm to 
invest in brand-specific technology for making Kodak aftermarket parts and then 
subsequently raised input prices. But the smaller firm might have made the 
investment without relying on any arrangements made between the firms. This 
difference was regarded as relevant in both Aspen and Trinko.59 While misleading 
one’s rivals might be tortious, it cannot be the basis of antitrust liability without a 
showing of consumer harm. 
The best view of Aspen is that destination ski passes on the Aspen slopes 
were a natural monopoly in the sense that Aspen consumers preferred the “all-
Aspen” ticket supplied by the joint venture between the plaintiff and defendant. 
Further, consumers could make only a finite number of ski runs on a given visit, so 
only that ticket maximized consumers’ surplus. One way to achieve the monopoly 
would have been for the companies to merge—something that actually happened 
eight years after the Supreme Court’s decision.60 Another way would have been for 
them to develop the natural monopoly input—the “all-Aspen” ticket—jointly but 
to maintain the competitive portions of their business, such as ski lodges, 
instructors, equipment rental and the like, separately. Under this view the 
defendant’s unilateral termination of the joint venture injured consumers by 
depriving them of the all-Aspen ticket, thus making the overall market smaller. 
                                                                                                                
  57. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 
1062 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting this contract lock-in 
theory of power on claim of unlawful franchise/pizza dough tie); Little Caesar Enters. v. 
Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459, 510 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 8 (1997) (stating that oil company may have used a combination of high 
wholesale prices plus maximum resale price maintenance to impose a squeeze on retail 
dealers); PHILLIP E. AREEDA et al., supra note 55, ¶ 519. But see Benjamin Klein, Market 
Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak: Applying Post-Contract Hold-up Analysis 
to Vertical Relationships, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283, 317 (1999) (disputing this theory). 
  58. The classic treatment of the subject is Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford 
& Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298–99, 302–04 (1978), which observes the 
threat of opportunistic behavior when trading partners have made specific investments 
linking them to one another, the excessive transaction costs that may result, and arguing that 
in most cases ownership vertical integration is an efficient alternative. 
  59. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (distinguishing Aspen on this point). 
  60. See Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 799 n.192 (1995). 
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However, it benefitted the defendant by giving it a larger share of the market as a 
result of the termination. This interpretation of Aspen is probably most consistent 
with a finding of consumer harm. 
In all events, consumer harm requires a showing of either higher prices or 
of reduced output, quality, or variety in the downstream market. Whatever impact 
Kodak has in the future, pure technological lock-in will not create this kind of 
power as long as consumers are free to substitute from one supplier to another.61 
Significantly, in the typical price squeeze case the smaller firm’s injury accrues 
from the very fact that consumers are able to substitute readily from the smaller 
firm’s output to that of its larger supplier. That is, the premise of the cases is that 
the smaller rival will lose too many sales because it is unable to match the larger 
firm’s resale price. 
Perhaps consumers can switch, but only between the smaller firm and its 
vertically integrated supplier. This could happen in a Kodak-style lock-in case in 
which a large installed base of locked-in consumers exists and the dominant firm 
supplies aftermarket parts to independent service firms, but only at an 
unreasonably high price in relation to the service prices that the smaller firm is 
able to charge.62 Once again, simply squeezing the independent firm’s margins will 
not harm consumers in the short run any more than would an outright refusal to 
deal. Perhaps the dominant firm is attempting to deny the smaller firm the 
resources necessary to expand into production of its own aftermarket parts. If 
proven, that particular claim may involve long-run consumer injury. 
B. Price Squeezes by Vertically Integrated Monopolists’ Appropriation of Rivals’ 
Fixed-Cost Investment 
A vertically integrated monopolist can be a firm with monopoly power at 
either level or both. The assumption in most price squeezes is monopoly power in 
the upstream market. Otherwise the unintegrated rival would be able to procure the 
input in question from a rival. At the same time, the price squeeze requires 
consumer harm in the downstream market, and this is unlikely to occur unless the 
integrated firm has substantial market power there. So we are presumably looking 
for a firm that controls a dominant share of relevant markets at both levels. 
The Linkline dissent and the Eleventh Circuit’s Covad decision both 
compared consumer harm in the downstream market to predatory pricing. They 
reasoned that harm could occur if the defendant used a price squeeze that 
incorporated a below-cost downstream price, which was presumably intended to 
drive the rival out of business and then permit the dominant firm to raise prices in 
                                                                                                                
  61. See Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc., v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1385 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (finding no consumer injury when tie is imposed on intermediary but customers 
are free to purchase the tying and tied items wherever they please). 
  62. This was one of the claims in similar litigation that involved Xerox. See In re 
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (D. Kan. 1997) (claim that 
Xerox charged independent service technicians a very high price for product-specific 
aftermarket parts). The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that Xerox had no duty to deal 
under the circumstances and that a patentee may charge any price that the market will bear. 
See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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that market to recoupment levels.63 The obvious question that arises is: why would 
the dominant firm undergo a costly period of predatory pricing when it could 
destroy the rival simply by refusing to deal? In virtually every scenario the simple 
refusal to deal would terminate the rival immediately and at lower cost and risk. 
One can imagine idiosyncratic exceptions. Perhaps the dominant firm has a ten-
year supply contract at a fixed price for the upstream input and thus cannot simply 
refuse to deal without paying a heavy penalty; however it could use downstream 
predatory pricing to shut the rival down. Furthermore, if a court has reason to 
believe that a firm set downstream prices below cost, such a scenario should 
simply be treated as a standard case of predatory pricing. 
Suppose the monopolist wishes to stop supplying an input to its rival and 
could lawfully do so immediately; or perhaps it plans to do so in the foreseeable 
future when its own downstream capacity has increased. However, the rival has a 
costly, dedicated facility with many useful years remaining. The dominant firm 
might then pursue a strategy of squeezing the rival’s margins so that they cover 
only variable costs, in effect appropriating its fixed-cost investment.64 While the 
dominant firm could do this by cutting its downstream price, the more promising 
strategy would very likely be to raise the upstream transfer price. This allows the 
integrated firm to keep the downstream price at its profit-maximizing level, which 
may or may not change after the rival exits the market. During the time that this 
squeeze occurs the dominant firm would in effect be obtaining the use of the rivals 
fixed-cost assets without paying for them. Eventually, of course, the smaller firm 
would go into bankruptcy or exit the market by some other means. 
Assuming that the refusal to deal and “instant” termination of the smaller 
firm were legal to begin with, is there any incremental consumer harm that might 
serve to turn this price squeeze into an antitrust violation? Of course, there might 
be harm to the creditors or shareholders of the smaller firm, but this is hardly clear. 
An abrupt refusal to deal might result in the immediate closure of the plant and 
have the same effect or worse on shareholders and creditors. But in any event, 
consumer injury would not obviously be any more severe when the small firm died 
a gradual death by squeezing rather than a sudden death caused by a refusal to 
deal. 
C. Long-Run Exclusion: Threat of Integration into the Primary Market 
In the long run consumer harm could result from a price squeeze that was 
reasonably calculated to deny a rival the opportunity to integrate upstream into the 
dominant firm’s primary market. Indeed, one of the purposes of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act was to facilitate the expansion of small firms into more 
                                                                                                                
  63. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 
2007) (Gould, J., dissenting); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 
1052 (11th Cir. 2004). 
  64. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19; infra Appendix B; see also 
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808–11 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
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“facilities-based” production.65 For example, a firm might interconnect with an 
incumbent exchange carrier at a time when it has only the limited technology 
needed to purchase bundles of long-distance minutes and repackage them for retail 
sale. However, it might use this market position as a base from which to purchase 
or develop additional backbone and eventually it might be able to deliver 
standalone service on its own. Thus, for example, the aluminum fabricator, once 
established, might integrate vertically into aluminum ingot production. Should it 
occur, such a development would surely benefit consumers. 
Suppose that the unintegrated aluminum fabricator purchases its ingot 
from Alcoa. The fabricator has three elements of cost. C1 is its variable costs of 
fabrication, which includes the price it pays Alcoa for ingot. C2 consists of fixed 
costs necessary to maintain investment in plant and durable equipment. C3 consists 
of research and developmental costs associated with its long-run plans to integrate 
vertically into ingot production. A price squeeze that gave the small firm enough 
margin to recover C1 and C2 might enable it to stay in production indefinitely, but 
deny it the resources needed to integrate vertically. The long-run result might be to 
forestall the rise of competition in the monopolized ingot market, and this clearly 
could constitute consumer harm. 
Conceding that long-run anticompetitive strategies are possible does not 
necessarily entail that antitrust can do anything about it. For example, the antitrust 
law of predatory pricing manifestly does not rest on the premise that long-run, or 
“sustainable” predatory pricing strategies such as limit pricing are implausible. 
Such strategies are easily modeled and perhaps some have been historically 
observed.66 The antitrust problem is administrative. There is no way to condemn 
such strategies without chilling pro-competitive behavior.67 
The problem in the price squeeze case may be a little more manageable. 
Importantly, in order to decide whether an unlawful squeeze occurred, the antitrust 
tribunal would not have to determine how much margin between wholesale and 
retail prices would be necessary to create the appropriate incentives to innovate 
and how much would be just enough to cover existing production. It might have to 
determine only that (1) the smaller firm had made a realistic threat to integrate into 
the dominant firm’s upstream market, and (2) knowing this, the dominant firm 
squeezed the smaller firm’s margins to the point that it could no longer recover its 
fixed cost investment. 
                                                                                                                
  65. See H.R. REP. NO. 104−458, at 113 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10; In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3714 (1999); James B. Speta, Antitrust 
and Local Competition Under the Telecommunications Act, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 99, 128−30 
(2003). 
  66. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Exclusionary Pricing, 2 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 21 (2006). See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE 
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 127−40 (1990) (arguing that U.S. Steel used limit 
pricing as a device for limiting the growth of rivals). 
  67. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 159–70 (2005). 
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The Microsoft case provides an analogy.68 If Microsoft feared that 
Netscape might eventually develop a computer operating system in competition 
with Microsoft’s Windows, it might impose higher costs on Netscape in order to 
restrain its growth by squeezing its margins. In the real case, Microsoft was not a 
supplier to Netscape. Rather it imposed other types of restraints that increased 
Netscape’s distribution costs and which may have prevented Netscape from 
integrating into the operating-system market.  
D. Long-Run Exclusion and Efficiency Gains in the Secondary Market 
The availability of a price squeeze might also limit the smaller firm’s 
incentive to innovate within the secondary market.69 In particular, there will be no 
incentive to reduce costs if the dominant firm can immediately capture the 
difference by squeezing the smaller firm’s margins. For example, if the aluminum 
fabricator developed a process that reduced fabrication costs by 10 cents per unit, 
its supplier might respond by simply pricing ingot at 10 cents more per unit. In that 
case the full value of the efficiency gains would accrue to the vertically integrated 
supplier rather than the innovator. In the end, the total profits observed by the 
recipient of the squeeze are the same as before. By the same token, a quality gain 
that draws in more customers (but leaves price unchanged) also permits a price 
squeeze to intensify. In this case, the rival’s margin can be reduced further so as to 
leave its total profits just as they were before the improvement. The vertically 
integrated firm, and not the rival, receives the benefits of the rival’s progress. It 
may seem that the appropriation of a rival’s efficiency gains would prevent prices 
from falling and would harm consumers, but this is not generally the case. By 
appropriating the smaller firm’s efficiency gains the integrated firm will very 
likely be prompted to lower its own retail price. In the end, assuming equal 
efficiency, prices may fall by the same amount whether or not the rival’s efficiency 
gains are appropriated.70 The consumer injury results not from the appropriation of 
efficiency gains, but rather from the reduced incentive that the smaller firm has to 
create efficiencies whose value will immediately be appropriated by another. 
Hence, despite the somewhat malicious nature of this sort of price 
squeeze, it is not clear that it constitutes anticompetitive behavior. If we assume 
that the vertically integrated firm has no responsibility to deal with its rival, such 
condemnation would in effect require firms to ensure the well-being of their own 
competitors. First, it would require that firms be able to estimate the cost structures 
of their competitors. Second, it would require that firms forgo potential profits and 
set sub-optimal prices in order to ensure that their competitors are able to sustain 
production. And even if these requirements are deemed acceptable, such policies 
do not seem likely to provide potential entrants with an incentive to innovate.71 
That is, if a vertically integrated firm is prohibited from imposing an overall 
                                                                                                                
  68. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12−14 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(findings of fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38−39 (D.D.C. 
2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see 3 ANTITRUST LAW, 
supra note 1, ¶ 617. 
  69. See infra Appendix B.3. 
  70. See infra Appendix C. 
  71. See infra Appendix B.3 (discussing Averch-Johnson-like effects). 
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unprofitable margin on its rival, it will still be permitted to impose a margin that 
merely results in little or no positive profits. Hence, any above-zero profits that 
could be earned by potential entrants could still be captured. As a result, firms 
would still have little incentive to innovate, as any increase in profits likely to 
result will still be captured by the rival. The only difference is that, in this case, the 
recipient of the price squeeze can sustain production.72 
III. IDENTIFYING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE PRICE SQUEEZE: PRICE–
COST RELATIONSHIPS, EFFICIENCIES, AND CONDUCT 
In his Linkline dissent Judge Gould objected that proof of an unlawful 
predatory price squeeze should require a showing of below-cost pricing in the 
downstream market. He would have dismissed the complaint because there was no 
allegation that the defendant priced below cost in the downstream market or had 
downstream market power.73 The Eleventh Circuit assessed a similar requirement 
in Covad Communications.74 In that case it is not precisely clear how the predatory 
price would have been measured. The court required both prices below cost and a 
likelihood of recoupment but did not specify whether these requirements applied to 
the upstream or the downstream market.75 
In Brooke Group the Supreme Court required that in an orthodox 
predatory pricing case, which involved selling a single product below cost in order 
to destroy or discipline a rival, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s prices 
were below a relevant measure of cost (typically marginal cost or average variable 
cost) and that the predator had a reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory 
investment during a subsequent period of monopoly pricing.76 In its 2007 
Weyerhaeuser decision the Supreme Court reiterated these requirements and 
applied them to a claim of exclusionary purchasing.77 
One problem with applying orthodox Brooke Group-style predatory 
pricing law in the downstream market is that in the price squeeze case the 
dominant firm typically controls a significant element of the rival’s costs, as was 
almost certainly the case in Linkline itself, as well as in Alcoa. An important 
rationale of the Brooke Group approach to predatory pricing is that one uses the 
defendant’s costs as a reference point to see if the prices in question are capable of 
                                                                                                                
  72. Cf. Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and 
Integration in Systems Markets, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 413, 423−24 (2000). 
  73. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 885−86 (9th Cir. 
2007) (Gould, J., dissenting). The district court had assessed a similar requirement. See J. 
Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279, 290 (2008). 
  74. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
  75. See id.  
  76. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
224 (1993). On determining whether prices are below cost, see 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra 
note 1, ¶¶ 739–40. On assessing recoupment, see id. ¶¶ 725−26. 
  77. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 
318 (2007). 
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excluding an equally efficient rival.78 But because the integrated firm forces its 
rival into double marginalization, the equally efficient rival standard does not 
provide a suitable baseline. Indeed, the test is perverse because the dominant firm 
effectively controls the unintegrated rival’s costs. Of course, this difference could 
be offset by a difference in the firms’ production efficiencies, but in that case the 
dominant firm would simply appropriate that difference as well. Any positive 
price–cost margin in the upstream market entails, ceteris paribus, that the rival will 
have higher costs than the dominant firm. 
To illustrate, suppose Alcoa manufactures and self-supplies ingot at a cost 
of $10 per unit but sells the same ingot to an unintegrated rival sheet roller at $13 
per unit. Presumably, the cost of the aluminum ingot is a significant component in 
the cost of sheet-rolled aluminum. Further, the basis of the price squeeze claim is 
that the rival cannot obtain the ingot elsewhere. As a result, the rival’s input costs 
are $3 per unit higher than the dominant firm’s. 
By contrast, Judge Hand’s “predatory margin” test in Alcoa would 
effectively have added $3 to the dominant firm’s “costs” in the above example by 
asking whether the dominant firm itself could profitably sustain production at the 
margin that it was imposing on the unintegrated rival.79 
Both tests have severe shortcomings. The predatory-pricing test analysis 
given by the Supreme Court in Linkline properly identifies predatory pricing as 
based on a nonsustainable pricing strategy that requires some kind of explanation, 
given that prices are below cost. However, it creates the wrong set of incentives: a 
vertically integrated dominant firm bent on excluding its rival will simply raise the 
upstream price rather than lowering the downstream price. By contrast, Judge 
Hand’s “predatory margin” test condemns an output price as predatory even 
though it is completely profitable to the defendant, provided that the upstream 
price is sufficiently high as well. Indeed, in the case of a dominant firm with 
market power in both the upstream and the downstream market, both prices could 
be well above cost, and yet there would not be enough margin between them to 
permit an independent fabricator to survive, even based on the larger firm’s 
fabrication costs. 
Judge Hand’s test does give a potential defendant a basis for measuring 
whether it is guilty of a price squeeze claim: either do not sell your upstream 
product to a rival at all or, if you do, make sure that the margin between your 
wholesale price and your own downstream resale price is equal to your own costs 
                                                                                                                
  78. Cf. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906−07 (9th Cir. 
2008) (bundled discounts case; applying predatory-pricing logic and concluding that test is 
whether the pricing is capable of excluding an equally efficient rival); MCI Commc’ns, 
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1113−14 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the purpose of 
cost-based predation tests is to determine whether the price is capable of excluding equally 
efficient rivals); Meijer, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 544 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(similar to Cascade). On the price standard for bundled discounts, see Erik N. Hovenkamp 
& Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (2008). 
  79. See United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1945); supra text 
accompanying notes 4–5. 
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for the intervening production. But that test tends to undermine the basis for the 
dominant firm’s wish to sell to a rival to begin with. If the vertically integrated 
firm can produce just as efficiently as the rival can, it might as well produce 
internally. On the other hand, if the rival has lower costs, the vertically integrated 
firm can profit by selling to the rival; the sale is profitable precisely because the 
vertically integrated firm can capture a portion of these cost savings for itself. So 
Judge Hand’s rule has the perverse effect of making it unlawful for the vertically 
integrated firm to sell to a rival in precisely those situations where it would have 
an incentive to do so. 
One reason why the vertically integrated firm might voluntarily sell to the 
rival in the downstream market is that it lacks its own production capacity in that 
market. Suppose Alcoa has a production capacity of fifty units of aluminum ingot 
but fabrication capacity of only thirty units. Then it might wish to sell twenty units 
of ingot to an independent fabricator, charging a price just sufficient to give the 
independent a competitive rate of return. In such a case it would have no incentive 
to force the independent fabricator out of business. To be sure, consumers would 
be harmed if the output of fabricated aluminum fell back to Alcoa’s own thirty 
units, but this would not be an output reduction that would benefit Alcoa.  
Once again, if Alcoa was in the process of bringing twenty additional 
units of its own fabrication capacity on line, then during the time this capacity was 
being developed it might have an incentive to squeeze the independent by reducing 
its margin to variable costs, thus effectively appropriating the fixed-cost portion of 
its investment. But it is not obvious that consumer harm results from this practice. 
A. An Average Variable Cost Test for Price Squeeze Claims? 
As noted previously, Judge Hand condemned Alcoa’s price squeeze after 
concluding that the margin between Alcoa’s wholesale ingot price to sheet rollers 
and its own resale price for rolled sheet was lower than Alcoa’s sheet-rolling costs. 
Judge Hand did not specify what measure of cost he had in mind, and Alcoa was 
decided thirty years prior to the formulation of the average-variable-cost, or 
marginal cost, test for predatory pricing, as Areeda and Turner formulated it in 
1975.80 In Linkline the Supreme Court made below-cost pricing in the downstream 
market dispositive.81 
Both Linkline and much of the literature have concluded that price 
squeezes should be condemned, if at all, only under a strict cost-based test. There 
are important differences between Judge Hand’s test and the Brooke Group test for 
predatory pricing. First and foremost, in an orthodox predatory pricing case the 
price below cost is “nonsustainable,” which means that the defendant loses money 
on each sale. A vertically integrated firm can impose a price squeeze by either 
lowering its resale price, raising its wholesale price to unintegrated rivals, or some 
combination of both. As a consequence, a price squeeze that flunks Judge Hand’s 
                                                                                                                
  80. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700−03 (1975). On the price–
cost tests for predation, see 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶¶ 739–42. 
  81. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). See 
supra text accompanying notes 21−47. 
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test can be fully sustainable. For example, suppose the cost of ingot is $10 per unit 
and rolling costs are $3 per unit, yielding a minimum cost price for rolled sheet of 
$13. Alcoa might charge customers of rolled sheet a price of $14 and charge a rival 
$12 for the raw ingot. In that case both the downstream price for the sheet and the 
upstream price for the ingot are above Alcoa’s costs, but the $2 margin between 
them is too small to permit the independent sheet roller to survive.82 
A guiding principle of predatory-pricing law is that a price below either 
marginal cost or average variable cost is highly suspicious and requires an 
explanation, given that such prices are unprofitable in the short run as well as the 
long run.83 By contrast, there is nothing inherently suspicious about a firm 
charging a high price to an unintegrated rival for an input. 
In an orthodox predatory-pricing case we presume that the victim is a 
free-standing firm able to procure its own inputs and survive as an independent 
rival in the market, but for the predatory pricing. In the price squeeze case, by 
contrast, the claim is that the rival cannot survive at all unless it can procure the 
input from the vertically integrated dominant firm. While that firm is in fact 
supplying the input, it will claim that it does so on terms that make it impossible 
for the smaller rival to survive. Moreover, in contrast with price squeezing, the 
potential for price predation exists in any concentrated market, making it nearly 
impossible for potential entrants to distinguish and avoid those commitments 
which are likely to result in predation. For these reasons we conclude that price 
squeezes are fundamentally not about predatory pricing in the Brooke Group 
sense. The only strategy that seems both rational and socially harmful to us is not 
price predation, but rather a squeeze that effectively deprives a firm of the fixed- 
cost portion of its investment or restrains the rival’s ability to integrate vertically 
so as to compete at both market levels with the dominant firm.84 
B. Joint Costs 
Joint costs, or economies of scope, occur anytime it is cheaper to produce 
two goods together than separately. Common costs are ubiquitous and can occur in 
the simplest situations. For example, a small grocery store adding a new product to 
its inventory, such as chocolate-covered macadamia nuts, will certainly have to 
incur the cost of wholesale purchase, stocking, the opportunity cost of the lost 
shelf space, and some sales expenses. However, it very likely costs no more to 
light and heat the store with the macadamia nuts than without them, and the 
incremental cost of the clerk’s time is undoubtedly far, far less than the cost of 
hiring an additional clerk. 
Joint costs often complicate predatory-pricing claims when the plaintiff 
sells only a subset of the goods or services that the defendant sells. Plaintiffs 
invariably prefer that costs be “fully allocated,” which means that a pro rata share 
of all relevant costs be assigned to the good upon which predatory pricing is 
                                                                                                                
  82. See infra Appendix B.1–2. 
  83. There may be a very few exceptions, such as where “shut down” costs are 
very high—but these can generally be taken into account by computing them as part of 
variable costs. 
  84. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
294 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51:273 
claimed. In that case, the defendant’s joint cost savings are ignored because the 
plaintiff does not observe them. But this has the perverse effect of condemning 
behavior that is profitable at the margin without regard to the impact on any rival. 
In any event, full allocation is not a sensible way for a multi-product firm to assign 
costs. For example, the grocery store manager considering whether to add 
macadamia nuts to her inventory will consider only the incremental costs of doing 
so, against the incremental revenues that their sale will produce. A firm that enjoys 
joint cost savings in the combined production of A and B will very likely have a 
profit-maximizing price that leaves rival producers of A alone unable to compete.85 
In the Covad decision, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had an 
obligation to allocate fully the cost of loops it was selling to the plaintiff for 
provision of DSL service, and if it did so it could not itself make a profit on the 
difference between the cost of the loop and the price it was charging to consumers. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the allegations were sufficient to survive the 
defendant’s motion for failure to state a claim.86 
But the issue is critical in a situation where the vertically integrated firm 
produces multiple products subject to joint costs while the rival produces only 
one.87 For example, suppose a vertically integrated airline company rents aircraft 
to rivals who organize tours, but also offers tour packages on its own scheduled 
flights. The airplane rental to the rival must be at a price sufficient to cover the 
cost of providing the plane, its fuel, its crew, and other associated costs. This might 
be $40,000 for a 100 seat plane, or $400 per seat per trip. But the airline sells tour 
packages that contemplate the use of otherwise unused seats on flights that are 
already scheduled. The incremental cost of filling an empty seat under these 
circumstances is much less than the fully allocated cost of a single seat on a plane 
that has not yet been committed. Suppose that the incremental cost of filling the 
empty seat on the already scheduled plane is $40, and the airline responds by 
offering a tour ticket for $50—a fully profitable transaction. In this case the small 
tour company would claim a squeeze and would even be able to show that the 
                                                                                                                
  85. The law of single product predatory pricing generally adopts this approach. 
See 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 742; see also Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 
1362 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that pricing designed to capture only the incremental cost 
of special advertising for lawyers not predatory); Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 
611, 614 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 343 (1984) (noting the 
difficulty of measuring the cost of one product where the “firm produces several brands of a 
product from the same plants, with the same workers and with some of the same raw 
materials” and explaining that in such cases, “the precise allocation among brands of even 
the variable production costs can be arbitrary”). Indeed, even promotion costs had to be 
allocated because promoting Maxwell House Coffee resulted in higher sales of both 
Maxwell House regular and instant coffee, but predation was alleged only with respect to 
the former. 
  86. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1051 (11th Cir. 
2004) (citing Complaint ¶¶ 93–95). 
  87. In the context of regulated industries, see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. 
Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1841−42 (2007). 
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wholesale price it was being charged for a seat was significantly greater than the 
retail price that the airline was charging for its own tour packages.88 
For purposes of regulatory policy, joint costs may have to be allocated, 
and perhaps under very complex regulatory formulas.89 But allocation formulas of 
this sort are not the business of antitrust law.90 A firm necessarily earns profits 
from an additional sale whenever the incremental revenue exceeds the incremental 
cost. Antitrust policy cannot ask for more, whether or not regulatory policy sees it 
differently. In the above airline example, any incremental price above $40 for a 
seat on an already scheduled flight is profitable to the dominant firm without 
regard to impact on rivals, and it certainly benefits consumers. This could also 
occur, for example, in the telecommunications industry, where a single hard wire 
“loop” may serve as a joint cost for both internet and phone service.91 
C. Other Production and Transaction Cost Savings 
The other kinds of cost savings that can accrue to the vertically integrated 
firm arise when some aspect of intrafirm production is cheaper than the same 
production that requires two firms plus a market transaction. In general, these 
savings involve either production costs or transaction costs. 
Production cost savings occur most frequently when intraplant production 
costs are less than the costs of production in two different plants. For example, 
suppose that aluminum ingot must be hot before it can be rolled into aluminum 
sheet, and ingot is very hot when it is initially produced. Further, it must be 
transported from the refiner’s plant to the fabricator’s plant. By rolling its own 
aluminum ingot fresh off the line, the vertically integrated firm can save the very 
considerable cost of reheating, as well as the additional cost of shipping the ingot 
by truck or rail to the sheet fabricator. Even in a competitive market a vertically 
integrated firm that sold ingot at its marginal cost and also fabricated sheet at its 
marginal cost would impose a squeeze on an unintegrated fabricator, who would 
face the additional costs of transporting and reheating the aluminum. Ronald Coase 
                                                                                                                
  88. Such a claim was alleged in the Linkline case. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
SBC Cal., Inc., No. 03-5265, 2004 WL 5503772, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2004); see Sidak, 
supra note 73, at 288. 
  89. See Alexander C. Larson, Pricing Principles in Telecommunications, in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LAW, REGULATION, AND POLICY 127, 130−45 (Walt Sapronov & 
William H. Read eds., 1998); Alexander C. Larson & Steve G. Parsons, “Building Block” 
Cost Methods for Pricing and Unbundling Telecommunications Services: Implications for 
the Law and Regulatory Policy, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 59, 60−62 (1995); Steve G. Parsons, 
Seven Years After Kahn and Shew: Lingering Myths on Costs and Pricing Telephone 
Service, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 166 n.70 (1994). 
  90. See Carlton, supra note 20, at 273; Sidak, supra note 73, at 296 (“[T]he 
judge’s job as de facto rate regulator would never end because external forces will compel 
wholesale and retail prices to change over time . . . .”). Cf. Town of Concord v. Boston 
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that price squeeze claim requires court 
to behave “like a rate-setting regulatory agency”). 
  91. See John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust 
Cause of Action, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563, 578−81, 600 (1984) (noting extreme technical 
difficulty in allocating joint costs in context of regulated electric power markets). 
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once famously observed that in fact two “firms”—the refiner and the fabricator—
could share a common building. The refiner could sell the ingot to the fabricator as 
it rolled off the line and the fabricator could then roll it hot, saving both the 
reheating costs and the transport costs.92 But there are typically good reasons why 
the two firms would not want to be placed into such a situation—mainly because it 
could create a bilateral monopoly between them. 
Transaction costs are the costs of using the market,93 and these can also 
be substantial, particularly when the good in question is made to specification or 
the market is not competitively structured. For example, ingot might be sold in an 
oligopoly market at a price significantly above cost. However, the firm that 
produces its own ingot necessarily receives it at its cost of production. So 
assuming that the vertically integrated producer is efficient it will obtain ingot at a 
lower cost than the firm that must purchase it. Again, this is the problem of double 
marginalization, which is inherent in price squeeze situations. 
Judge Hand’s price squeeze test in Alcoa should take both production cost 
savings and transaction cost savings into account by computing the allowable 
margin with respect to the defendant’s rather than the plaintiff’s costs.94 An 
ordinary predatory-pricing rule such as the one the Supreme Court required in 
Linkline,95 which identifies predation on the basis of the predator’s incremental or 
variable costs, does the same thing.96 The important thing is that courts avoid 
penalizing a firm for having lower costs than its rival. 
D. Upstream Transaction as Fixed Cost 
The Alpha/Beta example in the previous section illustrates the most 
commonly used example of a price squeeze: the upstream transactions are variable 
costs for the unintegrated firm; each unit sold upstream corresponds to one unit 
sold downstream; and the firm does not incur the cost unless it produces a unit. 
This situation provides an integrated firm with the greatest control over its rival’s 
margin. Price squeezes undoubtedly have the greatest potential for harm when the 
upstream transactions constitute variable costs to the unintegrated rival. However, 
this is not the only possibility. 
The upstream transaction may constitute a fixed cost of the unintegrated 
firm. Suppose I am a vertically integrated firm operating in the market for GPS 
devices, and am the sole supplier of GPS satellites. My rivals in the market for 
GPS devices must pay me for satellite service, which I price at $100,000 for ten 
years of access. This price is a fixed cost to my rivals over the ten-year period, 
because it does not change with the number of customers that the rival has or with 
                                                                                                                
  92. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 388 
(1937) (giving example of Lancashire cotton industry where participants in the various 
stages of cotton production rent space and purchase and sell the product from one 
production stage to the next). 
  93. Id. at 390. 
  94. See United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1945); see supra 
text accompanying notes 4–5. 
  95. See supra text accompanying notes 21–47. 
  96. See 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 1, ¶ 739–40. 
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usage rates. The average variable cost of producing the device itself is $50 per unit 
for both me and my rivals. Assume that the market price for GPS devices is $100, 
and that this price includes unlimited satellite service to customers. Also assume 
that my rival will determine whether to enter the market based on this information. 
Suppose I later decide that this new competition is more trouble than it is worth. I 
have already provided rivals with ten years of service, but even after the upstream 
transaction I am free to lower downstream prices. Depending on my rival’s 
production level, this has the potential to result in a price squeeze. However, I 
cannot manipulate my rival’s margin with the same fluidity that is possible when 
upstream transactions occur on a per-unit basis. For example, suppose my rival 
increases its efficiency, allowing it to sell at a downstream price of $50. I could not 
hope to appropriate any of my rival’s new gains until the next upstream transaction 
occurs, at which time I could again raise the price of satellite usage. In this 
situation, my rival need not worry that I will immediately appropriate the benefits 
of its various innovations. As a result, the potential for both competitive and 
consumer harm is much less, if indeed any occurs otherwise. 
This example tells us two things: First, the ability to impose a price 
squeeze depends on the integrated firm’s ability to manipulate the margin of one’s 
rival. Second, the ability to manipulate the margin of one’s rival is greater when 
transactions occur frequently in both the upstream and downstream market. 
IV. REMEDY PROBLEMS 
Antitrust rules that give small firms guaranteed margins are sure to be 
counterproductive. Greg Sidak speaks of one particularly perverse result of judicial 
recognition of price squeeze claims, which is that they could encourage price 
fixing.97 If anything, he understates the problem. In order to comply with such a 
duty in a regulatory context, a firm would file a tariff with an agency which, to the 
extent of its jurisdiction and competence, would assess any potential for a price 
squeeze that would harm competitors. But outside of the regulatory context there is 
no relevant agency, so the smaller firm would have to “file” its information with 
the dominant firm so that the dominant firm would know the minimum resale price 
it could charge to avoid the squeeze. That is to say, recognition of such claims, if 
based on a rule that entitles the smaller firm to a profitable margin, would virtually 
require price fixing by the two firms. It is no answer to say that the margin 
depends on both the downstream price, where both firms sell, and the upstream 
price, where the two firms are in a buyer-seller relationship. Once the upstream 
price is established, the existence of a squeeze depends on the size of the 
downstream price. This fact alone counsels strongly against an expansive price 
squeeze rule and forms the basis of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in 
Linkline.98 
Beyond that, the most commonly given objection to judicial recognition 
of price squeeze claims is an administrative one: assessing such claims requires a 
court to predict the “correct” price, and doing so places it in the position of a 
public utility regulator. That objection was valid when Judge Breyer uttered it in 
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1990 in the Concord public utility price squeeze case, and it remains so today.99 In 
the end, the plaintiff would be left with little or no incentive to innovate and, thus, 
the only real beneficiary of such a ruling would be the plaintiff itself. Consumers 
would not benefit and could be harmed in the long-run.100 
We find very little room for anticompetitive price squeeze claims 
generally when the dominant firm has no underlying duty to deal with the rival. 
We find some basis for liability in the unique situation where the dominant firm 
discovers that a rival, with an established dealing relationship with the defendant, 
is bent on integrating vertically into the monopolized input market, and the 
dominant firm responds with a price squeeze intended to deny the rival the 
resources necessary for such vertical expansion. In that very rare case, damages 
would presumably consist of the lost profits or loss of investment that the smaller 
firm suffered. Damages in such a case pose a significant problem, but it is not the 
kind of problem that Judge Breyer contemplated.101 
V. ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR UNILATERALLY IMPOSED PRICE 
SQUEEZES: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
All antitrust tests for price squeezes must be “cost-based” in the limited 
sense that there must be safe harbors for squeezes that fail to impose sufficiently 
small margins on rivals. Beyond that, however, cost-based tests are less useful for 
assessing price squeezes than for assessing other forms of pricing behavior. In any 
event, the Brooke Group test suggested in Linkline,102 which would look for prices 
below a relevant measure of cost and likelihood of recoupment in the downstream 
market is simply off point: it neither reflects likely anticompetitive strategies nor 
appreciates the impact of upstream price manipulation. Any rival that purchases 
the upstream output at a price above cost necessarily has higher costs than the 
dominant firm, assuming that it does not have offsetting efficiencies in other 
portions of its production. 
Our tentative conclusions concerning the use of cost-based tests for price 
squeeze claims are these: 
 Defendants should enjoy a safe harbor, or per se legality, when 
the margin between the wholesale price to the rival and the 
output price of the finished product is greater than the total 
(fixed + variable) processing costs that the defendant incurs for 
production between the two stages. 
 The defendant’s downstream prices below marginal or average 
variable cost should be subject to ordinary predatory-pricing 
rules and assessed without regard to the upstream transaction—
                                                                                                                
99. Cf. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(stating that price squeeze claim requires court to behave “like a rate-setting regulatory 
agency”). 
100. See infra Appendix B.3. 
101. On damages measurement for firms excluded by an antitrust violation, see 
2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, et al., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 349 (3d ed. 2007) (standing issues); id. 
¶¶ 392f2, 397 (damages issues). 
102. Id. 
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that is, such claims are not of a price squeeze at all, but simply of 
predatory pricing. The Supreme Court made this clear in 
Linkline. 
 If the margin between the defendant’s price for the upstream 
input to the rival and the defendant’s own second-stage output 
price is below either the defendant’s average total or the average 
variable cost of intervening production, then some further 
inquiry may be necessary. The most likely explanations are joint 
costs (economies of scope) or price discrimination, in which 
cases we would not find liability, and we would not force an 
antitrust tribunal to assume the regulator’s role of allocating 
fixed costs among multiple products. Liability is appropriate in 
the relatively uncommon situation when a margin squeeze has 
clearly been created by the dominant firm in order to prevent the 
smaller rival from integrating upstream into the defendant’s 
monopolized primary market. In any event, the Linkline decision 
appears to foreclose liability in all such situations. 
 If prices in both the upstream and downstream markets remain 
the same as before the plaintiff’s entry, or if the plaintiff had 
good reason to expect the prices observed during the squeeze, 
there can be no antitrust violation. An integrated rival cannot be 
punished simply because the rival overestimated its ability to 
cover its own costs. 
 Even if a firm appropriates the efficiency gains of its rival, we 
still expect prices to fall as a result. Thus, consumer harm is not 
likely to result from the fact that one firm has appropriated the 
gains of another. 
APPENDIX 
A. The General Case 
We assume a scenario in which a vertically integrated firm has a 
monopoly in the upstream market for Alpha (α). Alpha is an input used in the 
production of Beta (β), which is sold in the downstream market. We assume there 
is an unintegrated rival who buys wholesale Alpha in the upstream market, only to 
compete in the downstream market for Beta thereafter. We assume that firms 
choose to halt production only when price falls below average variable cost. 
Rival firms are assumed to face a total cost function of the form TC = (W 
+ Cf)Qβ + F, where TC denotes total cost, W denotes the upstream wholesale price 
the firm pays for the input in question, and Cf is the per-unit cost of intermediate 
processing or fabrication, which is the net cost of fabricating Beta from Alpha and 
preparing it for retail, etc. Qβ is the number of units of Beta produced, and F is 
fixed costs. 
We can then define the margin faced by the unintegrated rival and 
potential victim of a price or margin squeeze as: 
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Mg = P – W – Cf  
Where Mg is the firm’s margin and P is the downstream market price. In 
general, a price squeeze occurs if and only if the following condition holds: 
AVC ≤ P < ATC 
Where AVC denotes average variable cost and ATC denotes average total 
cost. Explicitly, this says that: 
W + Cf ≤ P < W + Cf + F ⁄ Qβ 
Where F is total fixed cost and Qβ is the quantity of Beta sold. From here 
it is straightforward to solve for the firm’s margin: 
0 ≤ Mg < AFC 
Where AFC is average fixed cost, which is equal to fixed costs over the 
quantity of Beta sold. Given explicitly, the condition for a price squeeze is as 
follows: 
0 ≤ P – W – Cf < F ⁄ Qβ 
This condition tells us that marginal profitability is nonnegative, so the 
rival will continue producing (for our purposes, this is equivalent to saying the 
downstream price is no less than average variable cost). An important corollary of 
this is that if marginal profitability exceeds zero, then there necessarily exists some 
output level at which that margin exceeds average fixed cost. That is, if marginal 
profitability exceeds zero, then there necessarily exists some output level at which 
total profits are positive and thus no squeeze would occur (ceteris paribus).  
B. Appropriating Fixed Costs, Rents, or Gains from Innovation 
When we say that a vertically integrated firm has “appropriated” the gains 
of its rivals, we determine the extent of this appropriation by comparing to the 
zero-profit level. That is, we compare to that level of profits which is achieved at 
the lowest sustainable level of marginal profitability. Of course, in our case the 
lowest sustainable level of per-unit profitability is equal to average fixed cost, at 
which level total profits are equal to zero. 
We define the total profit function faced by the unintegrated rival: 
TP = Qβ(P – W – Cf) – F 
1. Appropriating Fixed Costs 
Using the condition found in Part A of this Appendix, we see that zero is 
the lowest margin at which the rival will sustain production. In reality, the rival is 
indifferent to production at this level, but we will assume it chooses to continue 
until marginal profits are negative. In this case we have that: 
P – W – Cf = 0 
And, accordingly: 
TP = Qβ(0) – F = –F  
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Hence, to impose the most effective price squeeze possible is to 
appropriate an amount equal to the rival’s fixed costs. 
2. Appropriating Rents or Efficiency Gains 
Let us suppose that, due to unmatched efficiency gains, perhaps resulting 
from a patent, the rival is able to reduce its per-unit fabrication cost (Cf). We 
assume this cost decreases by an amount equal to G. We will also assume that the 
integrated firm was already imposing a price squeeze which, before these new 
gains, allowed it to capture its rival’s fixed costs. Accordingly, with the preceding 
squeeze in mind, we can define total profits as follows: 
TP = Qβ(P – W – Cf + G) – F = Qβ(G) – F  
Hence, if the integrated firm does not increase the intensity of the 
squeeze, the rival’s total profits increase by Qβ(G). However, under ideal 
conditions, the integrated firm can completely adjust for this by increasing W by G 
dollars. It should be noted that if the integrated firm simply reduced P by G 
dollars, consumers would appropriate the resulting amount; the integrated firm 
would likely lose profits in that case. 
This has important policy implications. If a defendant is alleged to have 
imposed a price squeeze in order to appropriate fixed-cost investments or other 
gains, then it must have done so by increasing the upstream price, not by lowering 
the downstream one. The latter possibility would likely only be used maliciously 
by a defendant whose sole motivation was to force its rival into foreclosure. Of 
course, from the perspective of the unintegrated rival, it makes no difference; they 
are equally effective in reducing its marginal profitability. 
There is a final possibility that should be mentioned. If the prevailing 
squeeze does not reduce marginal profits to zero, then the unintegrated rival would 
achieve greater total profits if it sold more units while its margin went unchanged. 
However, just as before, the integrated firm can adjust for this by further reducing 
its rival’s margin. Under ideal conditions, the rival’s total profits return to exactly 
the same level as before output increased. 
3. Incentive Changes and Averch-Johnson-like Effects 
The results in the above situations resemble somewhat those of the so-
called Averch-Johnson effect in price-regulated industries.103 Principally, if the 
firm’s rate of return is fixed externally, as by a government agency, then it 
substantially loses the incentive to innovate because it will be unable to pocket the 
resulting gains. Even the phrase “somewhat resembles” may overstate the 
similarity. Under rate-of-return regulation, the agency presumably has the public 
interest in mind and may engage in significant adjustment in order to avoid 
Averch-Johnson effects by permitting the regulated firm to capture at least some of 
the returns to innovation. By contrast, the vertically integrated monopolist wishes 
to maximize its own profits and will presumably balance short-run returns from 
                                                                                                                
103. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under 
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).  
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reduced margins against the long-run gains from allowing the smaller rival to 
innovate. 
Suppose an antitrust tribunal orders a price-squeezing defendant to afford 
the plaintiff a margin that allows it to cover both its variable and fixed costs. In 
effect, this requires the integrated firm to ensure that its rival does not earn 
negative profits. As a result, it becomes the responsibility of this integrated firm to 
(1) estimate the cost structure of its rival and (2) forgo potential profits and set 
non-optimal prices in order to ensure that its rival does not earn negative profits. 
In addition to these unreasonable requirements, such a ruling would have 
the perverse effect of eliminating the plaintiff’s incentive to innovate. After all, the 
integrated firm can still capture any and all positive profits earned by its rival. 
Thus, the unintegrated rival is operating at a fixed level of return. It has no 
incentive to innovate and, thus, the court’s decision has not helped consumers, nor 
has it truly improved competition. Rather, such a decision would do little more 
than allow a single firm to sustain production under circumstances that would 
otherwise prevent it from so doing. 
C. Appropriating Efficiency Gains: Impact on Consumers 
When a vertically integrated firm appropriates the efficiency gains of its 
rival, the effect on downstream prices is not obvious. To explore this, we apply a 
Bertrandian model of price competition in order to determine how such an 
efficiency gain would affect the optimal prices set by the two firms. 
To begin, it will suffice to define total profit functions for both firms. 
Subscripts “1” and “2” refer to the integrated firm and the smaller rival, 
respectively. Profit functions are as follows: 
TP1 = qα,1(W – C’) + qβ,1(P1 – C’ – Cf,1) – F1  
TP2 = qβ,2(P2 – W – Cf,2) – F2 
Where, for any firm i (where “i” can denote either “1” or “2”), TPi is the 
total profit earned by firm i, Pi is the downstream price set by firm i, qβ,i is the 
quantity of Beta sold by the firm i, qα,i is the quantity of Alpha sold by firm i, Cf,i 
denotes the per-unit fabrication cost of firm i, and Fi denotes the total fixed costs 
of firm i. Finally, C’ will denote the (constant) marginal cost of producing Alpha. 
Moreover, we assume a downward-sloping demand function that is linear 
and equal to the following: 
Qβ = A – BP 
Where Qβ is the total quantity of Beta sold in the market and A and B are 
arbitrary constants. Given that there are two firms in the market for Beta, we have 
that: 
Qβ = qβ,1 + qβ,2 = A – BP  
We let qβ,2 = qα,1, since we assume one unit of alpha is used for every unit 
of beta produced. Using this demand function, we can redefine total profits, 
allowing us to solve for the optimal price functions of each firm: 
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TP1 = (A – BP1 – qβ1)(W – C’) + (A – BP1 – qβ2)(P1 – C’ – Cf1) – F1 = (A 
– qβ1)(W – C’) – BP1(W – C’) + (A – qβ2)(P1 – C’ – Cf1) – BP1(P1 – C’ – 
Cf1) – F1 = (A – qβ1)(W – C’) + (A – qβ2)(P1 – C’ – Cf1) – BP(P1 + W – 
2C’ – Cf1) – F1 
By taking the derivative with respect to price, we can determine the 
optimal price for the vertically integrated firm. The first-order condition gives us 
that: 
0 = –2BP – BW + 2BC’ + BCf1 + A – qβ2  
2BP1 = –BW + 2BC’ + BCf1 + A – qβ2 
P1* = –(W ⁄ 2) + C’ + [(A + BCf1 – qβ2) ⁄ 2B]  
Following the same process for the unintegrated rival’s profit function: 
TP2 = (A – BP2 – qβ1)(P2 – W – Cf2) – F2 = (A – qβ1)(P2 – W – Cf2) – 
BP2(P2 – W – Cf2) – F2 
This gives us the following first-order condition: 
0 = A – qβ1 – 2BP + BW + BCf2 2BP2 = A – qβ1 + BW + BCf2 
P2** = (Cf2 ⁄ 2) + [(A + BW – qβ1) ⁄ 2B] 
Now, suppose the unintegrated rival undergoes an efficiency gain that 
brings its per-unit fabrication cost to Cf2 – G. Hence, the fabrication cost of each 
unit has decreased by G dollars. According to the rival’s optimal price function, 
this will reduce its optimal price by G ⁄ 2 dollars. 
But how will the integrated firm react to these efficiency gains? Indeed, 
as has previously been described in detail, the integrated firm has only to increase 
the upstream price (W) by an amount equal to the per-unit efficiency gain. Hence, 
following the integrated firm’s reaction, the new upstream price of Alpha is W + G 
dollars per unit. According to its optimal price function, the integrated firm will 
reduce its price of Beta by G ⁄ 2 dollars. This is the same amount by which the 
rival reduced its own optimal price. 
Hence, in the short run, even if the integrated firm appropriates the 
efficiency gains of its rival, consumers will still receive the benefit of lower prices. 
Indeed, both firms would decrease their optimal price by exactly the same amount. 
Thus, we would expect consumer surplus to increase by the same amount as well. 
Again, this has important policy implications. The appropriation of a 
rival’s gains from innovation will not likely have an adverse effect on consumers. 
Hence, that a firm has appropriated such gains from its rival does not prima facie 
imply that consumers have been adversely affected as a result. 
